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Abstract
The extent to which any policy, planning, or funding frameworks aimed at supporting climate 
change adaptation contribute to improved adaptive capacity of smallholder farmers is strongly 
affected by the power/influence dynamics between actors within those regimes. Power and 
influence studies have renewed relevance due to the current proliferation of adaptation 
initiatives. As these initiatives evolve, they bring up questions of equity, justice, and fairness 
surrounding the origins and distribution of adaptation resources. In doing so, they have shed 
light on persistent inequalities in status quo development regimes and asymmetrical power 
balances between stakeholders. 
To avoid exacerbating inequalities that contribute to conflict, perpetuate cycles of poverty, and 
prevent much needed resources from reaching vulnerable communities, it is essential that 
practitioners seek to make power/influence relationships transparent within any given adaptation 
regime. Exposing and characterizing these relationships is complex, sensitive, and involves 
multiple perspectives. This paper introduces the Multilevel Stakeholder Influence Mapping 
(MSIM) tool, which aims to assist analysts in the study of power dynamics across levels within 
climate adaptation regimes. 
The tool is adapted from the Stakeholder Influence-Mapping tool (2005) of the International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). MSIM is a simple visual tool to examine 
and display the relative power/influence that different individuals and groups have over a focal 
issue—in this case, climate change adaptation of smallholder farmers. The tool can be applied 
individually or in groups, as often as desired, to capture multiple perspectives and also to act as 
an intermediary object facilitating expression of sensitive information. The multilevel adapted 
version of the tool was trialed with a cross-section of actors in Nepal’s agricultural climate 
change adaptation regime. The results of this pilot, the tool use guidelines, and triangulation 
with supporting methods, as well as forward-looking applications in climate adaptation are 
provided herein. 
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Introduction
Small-scale agricultural producers in developing nations are hardly new to challenges. They face 
persistent livelihood threats of both natural and socioeconomic varieties. Many of the 2.6 billion 
individuals that engage in agriculture worldwide (IAASTD 2009) cope with extreme climatic 
events and variability (e.g., drought, floods, pests/diseases), limited access to agricultural inputs 
and markets, fluctuating commodity prices, lack of basic health and sanitation services, and in 
many cases, persistent cultural and structural inequalities. Meanwhile, the global food system faces 
never-before-seen pressures as the world population grows to an estimated 9 billion people by the 
year 2050 (UN-DESA 2010). Efforts to meet the caloric demand of this rapidly growing population 
will encounter a number of major existing constraints and others looming on the horizon. For 
example, food demand and distribution trends that reinforce existing caloric inequalities continue 
today, compounded by asymmetrical trade barriers and subsidies (Burton and Lim 2005). Demand 
for cereals is expected to increase by 70% to 2050, as a result of growing populations and 
increasing per-capita incomes, particularly in Asia (FAO 2006). All the while, regions like South 
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of the world’s hungry reside, contain extensive 
areas of low agricultural productivity due to a degrading resource and biodiversity bases 
(Vermeulen et al. 2012). Cutting across all of these challenges over the coming decades is the issue 
of climate change.
 
Modest estimates of global warming trends indicate a 2 degrees Celsius rise in global mean 
temperatures within the next century (Moss et al. 2008) with some recent estimates suggesting as 
much as 4.5 degrees Celsius. Even a 2 degrees Celsius rise in mean temperature will destabilize 
current farming systems (Easterling et al. 2007), transforming production patterns and crop 
productivity. The adverse effects of climate change on agricultural production are likely to be more 
intense in lower-latitude countries, particularly in the tropics and subtropics, even though the 
amount of temperature change here is projected to be less than in higher latitudes (Funk and Brown 
2009; Lobell et al. 2008; Parry et al. 1999). It is in these regions, where achieving food security is 
already problematic and crops are grown closely to their limits of heat tolerance and moisture 
availability, where the impacts of climate change will be felt with more intensity.
Whether food systems in developing nations can keep pace with growing food demands in the face 
of progressive climate change is a question concerning producers, decision-makers, and researchers 
alike (Hazell and Wood 2008; Ziervogel and Ericksen 2010). While efforts to encourage mitigation 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) have dominated international fora over the past decade, adaptation to 
the imminent impacts of climate change has achieved greater visibility in recent years (Kates 2000; 
Parry 2009; Pielke et al. 2007; Smit and Wandel 2006) owing to the presentation of adverse 
impacts on agricultural systems and an increase in the frequency of extreme events. 
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The role of state agencies and other national-level actors in actively promoting adaptation 
(planned adaptation) across governance levels—or fostering adaptation at the individual and 
community levels through the facilitation of an enabling environment—has been the subject of 
recent debate. Particularly so with the widespread establishment of national and international 
planned adaptation arrangements, such as the National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
(NAPA) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While 
many academics and practitioners in adaptation theory suggest that success in adaptation will 
require simultaneous action, both planned and autonomous, on multiple levels (Adger et al. 
2005; Cash et al. 2006; Ostrom 2012; Sovacool and Brown 2009), there remains a gap in our 
understanding of how central-level institutions influence coping and adaptation/adaptive 
capacity at lower levels (Adger 2001; Berman et al. 2012).
Ultimately, adaptation to climate change is a political process. It involves actors and institutions 
at multiple levels, biding for financial resources, constructing and maintaining institutions, 
prioritizing actions, and determining the allocation of scarce and competing resources. As such, 
the extent to which planned adaptation contributes to the improved adaptive capacity of small-
scale producers will be determined, in part, by the relative power/influence of actors within the 
climate change adaptation regime. 
Power and influence
An assessment of the institutional processes at play in any climate change adaptation regime is 
not complete without mention of the role of power. Power is a ubiquitous term and its various 
ontological and epistemological origins and manifestations difficult to identify. It is, as the 
concepts of adaptation, sustainability, and resilience, a boundary term, and its meaning highly 
dependent on the context in which it is applied. 
Power in the social sciences is often defined as the potential of an agent to influence a target 
(French and Raven 1959). Michel Foucault contributed an element of ‘resistance’ (“Where there 
is power, there is resistance”) to power relations in his work The Subject and Power, which has 
been subsequently adopted by most political theorists (Foucault 1982). As such, in political 
science, power is commonly defined as “the ability to influence the behavior of others with or 
without resistance.” In practice, power is often used interchangeably with the concept of 
“influence” (i.e., power produces influence and influence produces power), and can be exercised 
in more nuanced settings beyond that of “power over” another agent, including “power to” (i.e., 
capability) and Foucault’s concept of power as the enforcement of social and political practices 
occurring between agents, created by institutions and the discourses around them.
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Despite the vastness of the topic, power and influence studies have been viewed with renewed 
relevance as of late, due to the proliferation of climate change adaptation funds, projects, and 
programmes. As these processes evolve, they bring up questions of equity, justice, and fairness 
surrounding the origins and distribution of climate change adaptation resources. In doing so, 
they have shed light on persistent inequalities in status quo development regimes and 
asymmetrical power balances between stakeholders. 
In particular, the uncertainties and imperfect information related to the impacts and timing of 
climate change inject increased urgency in the study of power dynamics. In recognition of this, 
considerable emphasis has been placed on improving the ways that research is accessed and 
used in decision making around climate change. 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), for example, suggest that science and knowledge will never 
completely dictate policy since factors like values, power, and institutions will always intervene 
between knowledge and action. This pathway from knowledge to action can be especially 
tenuous when uncertainty prevails and information is particularly imperfect as is the case with 
climate change adaptation. Crozier and Friedberg (1977), in respect to their theory on organized 
action, refer to uncertainty as the “fundamental resource for any negotiation” and further  
suggest that “what appears as uncertainty from the point of view of the problem at stake 
constitutes power from the point of view of actors.” This concept can be applied between actors 
as well, suggesting that uncertainty can be used to leverage power and command decision-
making authority between stakeholders, a role that governments are particularly likely to take.
 
Dimitrov (2003) further discusses the topic of uncertainty as it relates to constructivist and 
rationalist decision-making theories, introducing a glaring paradox surrounding environmental 
policy regimes; i.e., that they have developed at all given extreme uncertainty and imperfect 
information (or sometimes a complete lack of information) to guide regime formation. Dimitrov 
suggests that “if collective action does not require information, than rational choice theories lose 
a major foundation.” He further suggests that constructivists, who see politics as a product of 
social learning, are equally without justification for decision making, concluding that if “shared  
knowledge is not an important independent variable, why study it as a dependent variable?”
The study of power and equity within adaptation regimes extends beyond controlling or 
leveraging knowledge and information. “It relates to a wide range of issues including: decision-
making processes—who decides, who responds; frameworks for taking and facilitating actions; 
relationships between the developed and developing world; and also to relationships between 
climate change impacts and other factors that affect and disturb” (Thomas and Twyman 2005). 
Improving our understanding of how power and influence originate and manifest in adaptation 
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institutions can lead us to support fair and sound decisions in resource allocation and ensure that 
vulnerable populations are appropriately safeguarded from significant impacts of climate change.
The CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) has 
initiated research in this regard, trialing a tool for mapping stakeholder power and influence. This 
paper contains the results of piloting a multilevel adaptation of that existing methodology. 
Influence mapping
 
IIED stakeholder influence mapping
Stakeholder influence mapping is a “simple visual tool to examine and display the relative  
influence that different individuals and groups have over decision making and how influence and 
cooperation change over time.” It was developed by James Mayers and Sonja Vermeulen at the 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and trialed under CCAFS  
Theme 1, Adaptation to Progressive Climate Change. See an example in Figure 1. 
The tool uses circles to represent different actor groups and individuals, placed within a pyramid 
where the policy/legislation (or broad scenario) in question serves as the pyramid cap or apex. 
Figure 1. Example IIED influence-mapping exercise
















































Policy actors from 1990 to 1997
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Influence is shown in the relative closeness of the circles to the policy apex, while relationships 
(degree of cooperation/conflict, etc.) are indicated by relative proximity and overlap of the circles. 
Different colour and size circles can be used to represent stakeholder groups during the mapping 
activity (e.g., individuals, government, and civil society) and the analysis can be done for different 
time periods to track policy evolution over time. Note that in this example (Figure 1), the output map 
is displayed in black and white with only the actor labels serving to distinguish between actor group 
type. The exercise has been traditionally conducted in focus group format, with selected policy 
“movers and shakers.” 
The IIED tool has been utilized by CCAFS in trials in Uganda in 2010 as a means of delineating 
strategies for influencing climate change adaptation policy (CCAFS 2010). The rationale for 
conducting the exercise was that in addition to the transfer of technologies to risk-averse small-scale 
producers, an enabling policy environment that provides safety nets in support of adaptation is 
necessary. Entry points for lobbying policy change as well as explicit areas for policy improvement 
were identified in the mapping exercise. Specifically, the focus group revealed that the President has 
the strongest direct influence on the behavior of farmers and that a disconnect exists between 
researchers and implementing agencies on the ground. The study also yielded key insights towards 
the development of coalitions between key actors in the climate change regime in Uganda (CCAFS 
2010).
While the outcomes from the Uganda trialing were fruitful, they reflect power and influence 
dynamics primarily at the central policy level. Focusing solely on “policy movers and shakers” at this 
level can produce a biased understanding of powerful agents and reinforce existing inequalities 
between actors. Climate change manifests across actor levels and scales and requires multilevel 
responses from a host of agents. Given the concentration of vulnerable populations in rural settings, 
power dynamics across levels and their role in creating adaptation pathways that reach from (inter)
national to local settings are important. Adjusting the tool to capture these cross-level dynamics is 
thus a valuable step in improving our understanding of how power descends/transcends actor levels.
Multilevel stakeholder influence mapping
The adaptation of the Stakeholder Influence-Mapping tool to encompass power dynamics across 
actor levels reflects a systems approach to adaptation research. That is, when addressing complex, 
“wicked problems” (Rittel and Webber 1973) like that of climate change, we are consistently making 
boundary decisions as to the scope of the problem, impacts, and responses. How we choose to draw 
those boundaries around scope, scale and time frame of adaptation, which disturbances elicit the need 
to adapt, and what drives the notions of desirability or improvement of the system often completely 
determines the conclusions and recommendations for action (Helfgott 2011). Because we each have 
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different perspectives, interests, values and so on, it is likely that we will make different 
boundary judgements in the same situation. Understanding, then, how decision-making 
boundaries are drawn and perceived by influential (or thought to be influential) actors provides 
insight into how success in adaptation is measured, who is intended to benefit, and where 
climate change policies are most susceptible to distortion or manipulation. 
Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) is a systemic methodology for handling several key 
perspective-related issues: (1) that system boundary judgements are inevitable and everyone 
makes them, scientists, planners, lay people alike; (2) that these boundary judgements are 
subjective and shaped by our values; (3) that they determine the knowledge generated and the 
conclusions and recommendations for action drawn; and (4) that planners can only ever refer 
back to the original whole of system judgements to justify the merits of propositions. It is a 
methodology that supports professional practice through critical employment of the systems 
idea and a framework for reflective practice. In Ulrich’s words: “Critical Heuristics is an effort 
to provide planners and citizens alike with the heuristic support they need for confronting the 
problems of practical reason [socially rational practice]” (Ulrich 1983). 
To operationalize these concepts, Ulrich developed a set of 12 ‘critical systems heuristics’ 
questions that both planners and ordinary people could use to think through and debate issues. 
These questions are asked about both what the situation is and what it ought to be, focusing on 
four areas: (1) Motivation – why would you want to be planning/intervening in this system in 
the first place? (2) Control – who should have decision-making power? What should people 
have some say over, and what shouldn’t they have a say over? (3) Knowledge and expertise 
– what forms of knowledge are necessary and from what sources? (4) Legitimacy – what are the 
values this is based on? Are you creating an oppressive system or one that benefits some and 
hinders others, and if so, what should you do about it? 
These CSH principles capture key components of power and influence in any decision-making 
process and, consequently, serve as a strong addition to the IIED stakeholder influence-mapping 
tool. 
Adapting the tool to elicit individual perceptions of influence at multiple levels requires only 
minor adjustments to the existing methodology, namely:
1. Translating the policy apex across levels (Step 1 in Box 1). We often use a different 
language to refer to the same concepts at different actor levels. While the apex title “climate 
change adaptation policy in agriculture,” for example, may suffice for mapping by actors at 
the constitutional level, this concept means very little to small-scale agricultural producers 
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at the operational level. Consequently, the apex title must be translated in such a way that it 
remains comparative across levels yet relevant to each stakeholder group. “Climate change 
adaptation policy in agriculture” may translate to “food production” or “food production in 
uncertain weather conditions” at the farm level, for example. The appropriate apex titles 
can be derived from semi-structured interviews (conducted before applying the tool) with 
actors at various levels that elicit commonly used terminology in reference to a fixed 
concept. 
Box 1.  The nine steps in the Stakeholder Influence-Mapping Process 
1. Define policy focus. Influence mapping is applicable to almost any decision-making (‘policy’) scenario. The 
choice of policy focus depends on the aim of the discussion among the participants—the overall problem or 
questions about policy that they are confronting. The tool can be applied to all sorts of policy contexts, from 
specific local policies to very broad positions involving government agencies and others such as the private 
sector.
2. Define one or more key time periods. Most simply, stakeholder influences at one time (usually the present) 
can be mapped. To explore policy change, more than one time period can be chosen, based for example on 
past/present/future, or based around a key event (before/after).
3. Identify policy stakeholders. Some of the main individuals and groups that have an impact or interest in the 
policy’s formation and implementation need to be identified and listed—either by participants in the mapping 
exercise, or perhaps with some pre-identification by the facilitators with the participants completing the 
process.
4. Prepare materials. One pyramid, drawn and labeled on a large sheet of paper, is needed for each time 
period. Other materials required are a selection of cardboard or paper circles in different sizes (different 
colours too if possible), some marker pens, and boards to pin up the pyramids so that all participants can see 
them. Alternatively the pyramid and circles can be laid out on the ground. The circles will be used to 
represent the various stakeholders over time, so that roughly the minimum number to prepare is the total 
number of stakeholders identified multiplied by the number of time periods. Having multiples of the same 
size and colour is useful.
5. Fine-tune the stakeholder list. If there is a long list of stakeholders, a relevant subset can be selected from 
the full list for each time period under discussion. Do not spend too long on this step, keep the full set of 
stakeholder groups if participants disagree on which to include.
6. Estimate stakeholder group size. Different sized stakeholder groups can be represented by different sized 
paper circles representing the number of people in the group (smallest=fewest, biggest=most). If there are a 
large number of stakeholder groups, different coloured circles could be used to represent different types of 
stakeholder groups (e.g., to differentiate government, private sector, and civil society groups).
7. Map stakeholder influence and relationships. This is the key step in the process—arranging the circles within 
the pyramid to display influence and relationships. Influence is shown by the relative closeness of circles to 
the policy apex, while relationships (degree of cooperation or conflict, and shared or divergent views) are 
indicated by the relative proximity and overlap of the circles. Most of the participants’ time should be 
allocated to this step.
8. Identify key moments and mechanisms. Policy events, notable moves made, and key external changes that 
have helped or hindered the process can be noted as they occur during the mapping exercise. Make sure to 
allocate some time to capture this useful information—one tactic is to select a note-taker or rapporteur 
among the participants.
9. Keep record of map for future reference. Sketching or photographing the map provides a useful record, 
especially if the notes and comments made by participants are also recorded.
SOURCE:  Mayers and Vermeulen 2005.
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2. Identify key moments and mechanisms (Step 8). The Multilevel Stakeholder Influence 
Mapping proposed here would serve as a visual activity within a one-hour semi-structured 
interview. That is, the completed influence map (conducted early in the interview) serves as 
the ‘object’ of an elicitation question, or a directive approach that uses a picture, video, text, 
or an object to prompt or elicit discussion (Tracy 2013). It has been suggested by some 
authors that the use of such an elicitation device can provide more realistic responses than 
would be collected through the use of words only (Prosser 2011).
Interviews are conducted with only one stakeholder at a time, to avoid domination in a group 
setting. This is particularly important in places with embedded power inequalities produced by 
caste structures or the like, which lead to micropolitics of domination in focus group settings. 
The tendency for the concentration of decision making in the hands of a dominant elite occurs 
across levels. As suggested by Heller (2001), even “when a weak state devolves power it is 
more often than not simply making accommodations with local strongmen rather than 
expanding democratic spaces.” Even more, embedding the tool in an interview format allows 
the analyst to capture these key moments and mechanisms in a way that reflects the cross-level 
realities of policy analysis. That is, what stakeholders make of the policies and the interplay 
between different policies is contingent upon the standpoint taken; either ‘top down’ or ‘bottom 
up’ (Sabatier 1986; Urwin and Jordan 2008). As proposed in the existing methodology, a 
note-taker/rapporteur role will be played by the principal interviewer. While the influence 
mapping is occurring, the respondent will provide responses to a series of questions designed to 
elicit concepts of motivation, control, knowledge, and legitimacy—the key components of the 
CSH framework. 
With these two adaptations in mind, multilevel stakeholder influence mapping includes the 
following steps articulated in Box 2. 
Nepal case study
MSIM was piloted as part of the Systemic Integrated Adaptation (SIA) project, a CCAFS 
Theme 1 initiative. The broader SIA research employs three principal data collection methods: 
(1) multilevel stakeholder influence mapping; (2) semi-structured interviews with stakeholders 
across actor levels in the climate change adaptation regime; and (3) the content analysis of  
16 adaptation and related policy documents. MSIM piloting, then, represents just one data 
collection method employed at the Nepal field site. A total of 14 separate respondents 
participated in the MSIM pilot, including six national-level respondents, six district-level 
respondents, and two local village-level respondents. Local-level (operational) components of 
this research were conducted in Nepal’s Rupandehi District, Makrahar Village Development 
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Box 2.  The eight steps in the MSIM process
1. Define policy focus. Influence mapping is applicable to almost any decision-making (‘policy’) scenario. In this 
case, climate change adaptation policies, projects, and programmes. 
2. Identify influence-mapping respondents. For the segment of respondents representing collective action and 
operation levels (district and village, respectively in the case of Nepal), a sampling strategy will need to be 
applied, starting with the selection of an administrative district. This can be done on the basis of vulnerability 
to environment change, should that information be available in the study country.
3. Identify relevant stakeholders to be mapped. A list of public sector, private sector, NGOs, bi/multilateral 
donors, community-based organizations (CBOs), and so on should be established prior to the interview 
process. The list used in Nepal’s MSIM pilot contained approximately 90 actors. 
4. Present the respondent with the list of actors in spreadsheet format. Ask the respondent to place a 
checkmark (‘tick’) next to the actors that they feel are MOST RELEVANT to the success or failure of the 
agricultural sector in the study country in the face of climate change. The respondent is free to add new 
actors to the list, or suggest that other be removed if they feel strongly. Allowing the respondent to remove 
an actor can reveal perceptions of “figure heads” or other perceived low-influence actors. On average,  
14 actors were selected by each respondent as highly relevant in the Nepal pilot, but there should be no limit 
placed on the number of actors the respondent can ‘tick’ as relevant.
5. Introduce the power-mapping board (Appendix 1). State that the exercise you are going to do together is 
designed to visualize power and influence between actors, as it relates to a certain policy or topic. Starting 
from our list of ‘ticked actors,’ we will be drawing circles on the mapping board with the most influential 
actors/actor groups closest to the top of the pyramid and the least influential at the bottom. Influence can be 
legal and non-legal, legitimate and illegitimate. The respondent should be told that the objective is to define 
how things actually are, not the way that they are intended to be. Relationships between actor groups can be 
represented by overlapping/concentric circles. Additional actors that come to mind that were not initially 
indicated in step 4 by the respondent can now be added. Note: An example, unrelated influence map can be 
shown to the respondent to be sure that they understand the concept. 
6. Define “influence” and its relation to “power” as it is understood within your conceptual framework (note 
that this will be different for every study). An example could be: Power = the ability to influence the 
behaviour of others, with or without resistance (Positional, Personality, Persuasion, Coercion, Force, 
Knowledge, Resources. These are referred to as power bases); Influence = the ability to exercise a particular 
type(s) of power. 
7. As each actor is placed on the map, ask:
a. What type of power/influence is this actor/actor group exercising? (Positional, Party association, 
Personality [charisma], Persuasion, Coercion [bribery], Force, Knowledge, Resources?) 
b. What gives this actor/actor group the right to exercise power? Note: This is aimed at drawing out policy/
legal frameworks.
c. Do you see this actor/actor group as legitimate or respected?
8. Once the mapping is complete, review the influence map with respondent. Ask: 
a. Which are the main policies, laws, or constitutional mandates related to the environment, climate 
change, sustainable development (agriculture, livestock, and food security), or local governance in the 
study country that affect the relationships between these actors? 
b. Do policies from different sectors contradict or conflict one another? In what way? How about positive 
interplay (e.g., reinforcing one another in a beneficial way)?
c. Ask the respondent to study the actors at the top of the newly created influence pyramid. Do you think 
that these top actors should be the ones making these decisions or have this much influence?
d. Where do these actors go for knowledge and expertise?  Where should they go? Where would you go?
e. Who else should have a say? By what means/channels do they have a say?
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Committee (VDC), located in south central Nepal along the Indian border. District-level 
(collective action) data collection occurred in the municipality of Bairahawa, Rupandehi’s 
designated District Development Committee (DDC); while central-level (constitutional)1 data 
collection occurred in Nepal’s capital city, Kathmandu. Interviews lasted on average 1.5 hours. 
Data were collected between May and September 2012.  
Results
The MSIM apex of “agricultural climate change adaptation policy” was translated across actor 
levels as identified in Box 3.
Box 3.  Influence apexes as translated across actor levels
a. Climate change adaptation policies in agriculture (Central Level)
b. The design and implementation of climate change adaptation initiatives or strategies in agriculture 
(District Level)
c. The ability to produce food, earn income, or subsist when the weather changes (Local Level)
The chosen apexes reflect the stages of the policy development process, denoted by Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (1993) as “stages heuristics:” (1) problem identification, (2) agenda setting,  
(3) formulation, (4) adoption, and (5) evaluation. The stages heuristics view of the policy 
process necessarily involves actors across levels, with the ‘policy’ and associated agents 
manifesting in different ways during each stage of the development, implementation, and 
evaluation process. The development of new crop varieties, for example, consists of a set or 
prioritized objectives and responsible parties at the central level (e.g., crop varieties, climate 
stressor, responsible agency, and so on), research and development and replication facilities at 
the regional and district level, and participatory varietal selection initiatives at the community 
level. Each stage mobilizes different agents performing diverse tasks under one policy umbrella. 
Participants in the influence-mapping exercise were asked to first indicate actors (individuals or 
organizations) “relevant” to the policy apex, translated for the appropriate actor level. A 
comprehensive list of approximately 90 actors (see Appendix 2) was developed through 
snowballing interviews conducted prior to the influence-mapping trials, during the first phase of 
the field research. Respondents were encouraged to write-in any actors/actor groups they 
perceived to be ‘missing’ from the list. Table 1 shows the actors/actor groups most frequently 
identified as “relevant” to climate change adaptation regimes (in % of respondents) by the entire 
sample of 14 respondents. 
1. The terms ‘operational,’ ‘collective action,’ and ‘constitutional’ refer to the levels of analysis in Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis 
and Development Framework (Ostrom 1999).
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The respondent then visually ranked each of the actors deemed “relevant” on an influence 
pyramid with the most influential positioned at the top, or apex of the pyramid, and the least 
influential at the bottom. The size of the circle, as suggested in the methodology, represents the 
relative size of the actor group and overlap of actor circles suggests a relationship (embedded 
hierarchical structure, collaboration between agencies, and so on). Four distinct colours 
represent actor/actor group categories including civil society (purple), state agencies (red), 
international/foreign agency (blue), and private sector (orange). Select influence maps created 
by individual actors from the local to national policy-making level can be found in Figure 2. 
Note that these MSIM maps in Figure 2 are intended only to provide an idea of the trends 
produced through multiple applications of the MSIM tool. Respondent names and the individual 
actor labels for each circle have been removed. 
A detailed example of an MSIM map as completed by a district-level actor can be found in  
Figure 3. The respondent2 is a bureaucrat working in a relevant district office in Bairahawa 
—one of two principal municipalities in Rupandehi district—located only 10 km north from the 
Indian border. The respondent identified a total of 26 ‘relevant’ actors to the design and 
implementation of climate change adaptation initiatives or strategies in agriculture from the 
complete list of 90. These 26 respondents were ranked on 19 unique influence levels during the 
ranking portion of the exercise. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, represent three distinct actor groups, but have 
been ranked on the same level of influence. 
Table 1. Actors/actor groups most frequently identified as “relevant” to agricultural  
 climate change adaptation regimes in Nepal by percentage of respondents
Actor/Actor Group Frequency (% of respondents)
Ministry of Agriculture Development (MoAD) 81%
District Development Committee (DDC) 75%
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) (World Vision,  
IDE, CARE, WWF, Practical Action, Oxfam, Action Aid, among others) 69%
National Planning Commission 63%
Farmers 63%
Village Development Committee (VDC) 63%
Political Parties (NC, CPN-UML, UCPN-Maoist, CPN-Maoist,   
Madhesi Front, and so on) 63%




Ministry of Environment 56%
2. The respondent’s identity and office have been excluded from this document to ensure anonymity.
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Figure 3. Detailed stakeholder influence map (Government of Nepal bureaucrat)
Note: Full actor/actor group names from most influential to least influential are as follows: 
political parties; National Planning Commission; Ministry of Agriculture Development (formerly, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives); Ministry of Environment; National Agricultural 
Research Council; Multistakeholder Climate Change Initiatives Coordination Committee; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Local Development (formerly, Ministry of Local Development); 
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development; Ministry of Information and 
Communication; Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment; Ministry of Irrigation; 
Ministry of Commerce; Department of Livestock Services; Agricultural Cooperatives; 
International Non-Governmental Organizations; Agricultural Inputs Company Limited; Youth 
Groups; Nepal Department of Hydrology and Meteorology; The World Bank; Asian Development 
Bank; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation (Department 
of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation); Traders; Agrovets (small-scale, private agricultural 
input providers and providers of veterinarian services); Farmers.
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The most influential group in regard to climate change adaptation interventions in Nepal from 
the perspective of the respondent was “political parties.”  This includes principally the Nepali 
Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML), and the 
Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M), the leading parties within the now 
dissolved Constituent Assembly (CA). The respondent identified Prime Minister Bhattarai as 
relevant, but only by extension of the political parties and not as a solitary actor himself. The 
respondent suggested that the political parties in Nepal were pervasive and active in “changing 
the scenarios in which all other [actors] operate.” They hold key positions in Nepal’s central-
level decision making, including ministerial posts. The respondent stated, however, that 
“[political parties] are not always operating with the proper moral character” in terms of equity 
in decision making and accountability. The National Planning Commission (NPC), ranked 
second most influential from the respondent’s perspective, was highly influenced by the political 
parties, as most NPC members are politically appointed.  
The respondent indicated that the Ministry of Environment (MoE), the focal point agency for 
climate change in Nepal, was influential in terms of its potential to raise awareness of the 
impacts of climate change but that “it should be a line agency,” with offices that extend beyond 
the central level and into District Development Committee (DDC) or Village Development 
Committee (VDC) levels. As it stands, MoE plays a coordinating role between other ministries 
with line-agency status, particularly that of the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local 
Development (MoFALD), which coordinates DDC and VDC activities. 
Other influential actor groups include the World Bank, ADB, and IMF, which leverage their own 
agendas through the transfer of funds to the Government of Nepal (GoN) (“we’re giving you the 
money, so we’ll decide how it’s spent”) and the Indian Government which the respondent 
suggests that the Nepalese try to emulate, influenced by their economic status, and a shared 
(similar) language and religion. The regional United Nations office location in India also 
contributes to India’s geopolitical influence over Nepal according to the respondent. 
In terms of the multilevel dynamics of climate change policy, the respondent sketched a small 
diagram to demonstrate key barriers to policy implementation. This was prompted by a series of 
follow-up critical systems heuristics questions after the influence mapping had taken place, 
aiming to identify key challenges in the adaptation policy process. This sketch has been 
digitized in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Barriers to adaptation policy processes according to a GoN bureaucrat operating 












Barrier #1: Ministries are not disseminating 
knowledge on climate change and 
are failing to promote awareness
Barrier #3: VDC accepting projects prioritized 
and originating from local level by 
communities uniformed about climate 
change and with a different, shorter 
planning horizon
Barrier #2: Without elections, VDC staff are 
government bureaucrats and 
cannot make informed decision 
on local-level priority projects
The barriers to policy development and implementation are fourfold from the perspective of the 
respondent. 
1. GoN line ministries are not properly disseminating knowledge on climate change and are 
not promoting awareness to the extent needed. This is a product of both limited human 
resources for dissemination and incomplete understanding of climate change processes on 
the part of ministerial bureaucrats. 
2. Following the elimination of local-level political elections, the duties of VDC bureaucrats 
have expanded to cover the roles previously held by publicly elected officials. This has led, 
in the eyes of the respondent, to an overextension of VDC Secretary duties and reduced 
ability to determine local-level development needs. 
3. The third barrier is influenced by both of the previous circumstances. That is, the 
participatory local-level planning processes driven by Local Governance and Community 
Development Program (LGCDP) do not operate on a forward-looking, proactive planning 
mechanism. The LGCDP has been put in place to fill the void of local elected officials and 
provides the VDC office with prioritized projects for budgeting. They prioritize projects on 
the basis of current risk and development challenges (i.e., reactive planning) and are not 
properly versed in the forthcoming impacts or necessary considerations for climate-proofing 
development initiatives. 
4. The fourth and final barrier identified by the respondent is related to the GoN budgetary 
process. VDCs and DDCs are each allocated a certain development budget by the NPC and 
Barrier #4: Beyond DDC level projects, there is 
little chance of receiving central-level 
funding unless politically connected, 
or matching policy directives directly
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Ministry of Finance (via the MoFALD) to fund projects at the local level. Those projects 
that extend beyond the capacity of the VDC or DDC to fund (e.g., a bridge or irrigation 
system) are eligible to compete for a limited pool of central-level funds. The respondent 
suggests, however, that without a political connection at the central level, large-scale 
projects are rarely funded. Equity, then, in the distribution of funds for infrastructure or 
other large-scale projects required by climate change is difficult to ensure.  
As noted at the outset, the above discussion is simply an example of the type of data produced 
from one individual viewpoint. The themes emerging in Figure 4 identifying policy barriers are 
unique only to this respondent, and are thus not necessarily reflective of wider prevailing views. 
When aggregated with other actor perspectives, however, it then would start to shape the 
narrative of power and influence in Nepal’s agricultural climate change adaptation regime. 
Measuring influence
From the detailed example above, we see that the MSIM stimulates discussion that extends 
beyond the relative influence between actor and actor groups in climate change adaptation 
regimes. It can help us to understand the institutional context in which actors are embedded and 
identify key tripping points in the policy process, among other things. But the perceived relative 
influence (i.e., the theoretical distance) between actors remains important. Viewed as an output 
in itself, influence maps can be analyzed to identify key organizations to engage in the policy 
development process, and can highlight actors/actor groups overlooked or neglected in this 
same process. As such, calculating the relative influence between actors as revealed in multiple 
iterations of the mapping activity can yield valuable, triangulated information regarding actor 
power and influence. 
To create an influence score derived from multiple interviews, the frequency that actors were 
deemed “relevant” by interviewees was combined with their relative ranked position compared 
to other actors. The relative ranking score was established by counting actors/actor groups 
upwards from the bottom of each influence map and assigning the counted value as a ranking 
score. That is, the actor placed lowest on the influence map received a ranking score of 1, the 
second lowest a score of 2, the third lowest a score of 3, and so on. Actors/actor groups placed 
on the same level as one another received the same ranking score (e.g., “farmers” and “rural 
poor” placed side by side at the bottom of an influence pyramid would both receive a ranking 
score of 1). As there was no limit applied to the number of actors that the respondent could 
identify as “relevant,” a different number of ranking levels could feasibly be identified by each 
respondent. As such, the number of ranked levels was identified for each of 14 respondents 
yielding an average of 14 ranked actor levels. The relative ranking was adjusted to this 14-actor 
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equivalent by applying a ratio formula and solving for ‘Ra’. After applying this function, the 
highest possible ranking score was 14 and lowest 1 across all influence maps. The adjusted 
relative influence ranking is determined as follows:
 R/n = Ra/14
 Where ‘R’ represents the relative ranking (unadjusted), ‘n’ the total number of ranked  
 levels identified by the respondent, ‘Ra’ the adjusted ranking score, and ‘14’ the average  
 number of ranked levels over all 14 pilot iterations.   
An initial ranking score (R) of 8, for example, among 10 ranked actors (n), is adjusted to a 
ranking (Ra) of 10 on a 14-actor scale. An excerpt from the table containing both ranking and 
adjust rankings is found below (Table 2).
Table 2.  Example ranking and adjusted ranking table
  Respondent 1 Respondent 2
Actor/Actor Group Ranking Adjusted Ranking Adjusted
 (R) Ranking (Ra) (R) Ranking (Ra)
Ministry of Agriculture Development (MoAD) 9 10 12 14
Ministry of Environment (MoE) 7 8 - -
National Planning Commission (NPC) 5 5 12 14
The average adjusted ranking score (xRa) was calculated by dividing the summed adjusted 
ranking scores for each actor group by the total number of respondents identifying that actor 
group as relevant. 
Combining the adjusted ranking score of each actor group with the frequency that the group was 
identified as “relevant” by the respondent is the final step in identifying a composite influence 
score. Two strategies are highlighted here for producing this frequency and rank composite 
score. 
The first composite influence score approach is based on a direct summing of the frequency and 
adjusted ranking score. That is, the frequency that the actor group was included in the ranking is 
added to the mean adjusted ranking score.
 I = F + xRa
 Where ‘I’ represents the composite influence score, ‘F’ the frequency that the actor  
 group was included in the ranking and ‘xRa’ the mean adjusted ranking score. 
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When calculated in this manner, the following influence scores are achieved, displayed alongside 
their respective actor/actor group (Table 3). In this scenario, the Ministry of Agriculture 
Development (MoAD) receives the highest composite influence score with regard to agricultural 
climate change adaptation policy across 14 iterations of the mapping exercise. The MoAD is 
followed closely by the Ministry of Environment and the National Planning Commission. 
Table 3.  Top influence ranking scores by actor/actor group (approach 1)
Actor/Actor Group  FREQUENCY AVERAGE COMPOSITE  
  ADJUSTED INFLUENCE 
  RANKING  SCORE
Ministry of Agriculture Development (MoAD) 11 10 21.0
Ministry of Environment (MoE) 9 12 20.5
National Planning Commission (NPC) 8 12 20.0
INGOs (World Vision, IDE, CARE, WWF, Practical Action,  
Oxfam, Action Aid, and so on) 11 9 19.7
Climate Change Council (CCC) 5 13 17.5
Village Development Committee (VDC) 11 5 16.4
Indian Government 7 9 16.3
Traders 9 7 16.0
Political parties (NC, CPN-UML, UCPN-Maoist, CPN-Maoist,  
Madhesi Front, and so on) 8 8 16.0
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 4 12 15.7
Nepal Agricultural Research Council (NARC) 6 10 15.7
Prime Minister (Bhattarai) 2 14 15.7
This first approach to determining an influence score, however, tends to favour outliers with 
respect to either the frequency identified or the mean adjusted ranking score. The inclusion of 
PM Bhattarai in Table 3 exemplifies this trend. The PM was identified only twice as “relevant” 
to the climate change adaptation policy process, but in those two instances the PM was ranked 
among the most highly influential actors. His mean adjusted ranking is 14 (the highest possible) 
and when combined with a frequency of 2 still ranks in the top influence scorers.
The second approach to producing a ranking score seeks to combine both ranking and frequency 
metrics into one composite score in an effort to reduce the impact of mismatches between 
frequency identified and mean adjusted rankings (as per the case with PM Bhattarai). In this 
approach, the adjusted rankings for each actor/actor group are summed and then divided by the 
maximum frequency score of 14 (i.e., the actor was identified as relevant by all respondents in 
the sample). This, in effect, includes in the calculation the instances that an actor/actor group 
was not identified as relevant (i.e., with a mean adjusted ranking of zero). 
 I = ΣRa (n1-n14)/14
 Where ‘I’ represents the composite influence score, ‘Ra” the adjusted ranking, ‘n’ the  
 respondent number, and 14 the maximum frequency score. 
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When calculated in this manner, the following influence scores are achieved, displayed 
alongside their respective actor/actor group (Table 4). The top four actors/actor groups remain 
unchanged between the two approaches. A few small changes, however, do occur. USAID and 
PM Bhattarai are eliminated from the top ranking list and the Ministry of Federal Affairs and 
Local Development (MoFALD) and DDC take their places. 
Table 4.  Top influence ranking scores by actor/actor group (approach 2)
Actor/Actor Group  AVERAGE COMPOSITE  
 ADJUSTED INFLUENCE  
 RANKING SCORE
Ministry of Agriculture Development (MoAD) 10 7.9
Ministry of Environment (MoE) 12 7.4
National Planning Commission (NPC) 12 6.9
INGOs (World Vision, IDE, CARE, WWF, Practical Action, Oxfam, Action Aid, and so on) 9 6.8
Indian Government 9 4.6
Political parties (NC, CPN-UML, UCPN-Maoist, CPN-Maoist, Madhesi Front, and so on) 8 4.5
Traders 7 4.5
Climate Change Council (CCC) 13 4.5
Village Development Committee (VDC) 5 4.3
Nepal Agricultural Research Council (NARC) 10 4.2
Ministry of Local Development (MLD) 9 4.0
District Development Committee (DDC) 6 3.9
There are several other approaches that the analyst could choose in producing an influence 
score. A weight, for example, could be applied (50% frequency, 50% adjusted ranking; 25% 
Frequency, 75% adjusted ranking, and so on) to place equal or more/less importance on the 
variables. Ultimately, the means by which an influence score is calculated is less important than 
the qualitative trends that emerge from the influence maps. 
The results that we see above include responses from the complete pilot sample set (n=14), 
actors operating at the local, district and central level. Analysing the data from the perspective 
of a select subset of actors can also yield valuable results. For example, Table 5 holds the results 
of the mapping exercising using only the responses from local (operational level) actors (n=5) 
representing community members, local NGOs, VDC personnel, and private sector input 
providers. Actors in this sample responded to the local-level policy apex of “The ability to 
produce food, earn income, or subsist when the weather changes.”
We see that a very different top list of influential actors is identified using this local actor subset. 
Traders, INGOs, and the VDC are deemed most influential from the perspective of these actors. 
Actors previously absent from the complete sample set (n=14), including local NGOs, 
community leaders, the Agricultural Service Center and the Department of Livestock Services, 
are now visible in the rankings. 
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Table 5. Top influence ranking scores by actor/actor group from the perspective of local-
and district-level respondents (approach 2)
Actor/ Actor Group  AVERAGE COMPOSITE  
 ADJUSTED INFLUENCE  
 RANKING SCORE
Traders 8 6.7
INGOs (World Vision, IDE, CARE, WWF, Practical Action, Oxfam, Action Aid, and so on) 8 6.5
Village Development Committee (VDC) 10 6.1
Local NGOs 8 6.0
Indian Government 7 5.6
Political parties (NC, CPN-UML, UCPN-Maoist, CPN-Maoist, Madhesi Front, and so on) 6 5.0
Ministry of Agriculture Development (MoAD) 12 4.8
Community leaders 11 4.4
District Agricultural Development Office (DADO) 11 4.3
Agricultural Service Center 11 4.3
Department of Livestock Services (DoLS) 10 4.1
National Planning Commission (NPC) 10 4.0
Note that it is important to recognize that there is often as much variability in opinions on a 
particular social topic within a social group as there is between social groups. The analyst must 
use caution in drawing conclusions from aggregated data produced from actors deemed to exist 
within the “same stakeholder group.” To account for the plurality of perspectives and identities, 
MSIM analysis should be complemented with rigorous analyses of respondent characteristics 
and utilize narratives and discourse analyses, for example, that provide an indication of 
important value sets and world views. 
While the identification of highly influential actors is valuable for engagement and lobbying in 
the policy arena, the identification of those actors/actor groups that are deemed least influential 
is equally descriptive. Table 6 identifies the actors with the lowest influence scores (using 
calculation approach 2) among those actors/actor groups identified as “relevant” by six or more 
respondents. 
Table 6 shows that ‘farmers’ are the least influential of the relevant stakeholders in the 
agricultural climate change adaptation policy development and implementation process. 
Farmers were identified by 8 of the 14 respondents as relevant, and received an average adjusted 
ranking of 1.9, which combined with this frequency in approach 2 produces an influence score 
of 1.1, the lowest of all highly relevant actor groups. Nepal’s Agricultural Inputs Company, 
responsible for subsidized fertilizer distribution in the country, received an influence score of 
2.7 followed by Agrovets (2.7), agricultural cooperatives (3.0), and community leaders (3.3). 
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Table 6.  Lowest influence ranking scores by actor/actor group (approach 2)
Actor Group FREQUENCY AVERAGE COMPOSITE  
  ADJUSTED  INFLUENCE 
  RANKING SCORE
Farmers 8 1.9 1.1
Agricultural Inputs Company Ltd (AICL) 7 5.4 2.7
Agrovets 6 6.3 2.7
Agricultural cooperatives 9 4.6 3.0
Community leaders 6 7.7 3.3
Local NGOs 8 6.0 3.4
Ministry of Irrigation (MoIR) 6 8.0 3.4
District Development Committee (DDC) 10 5.5 3.9
Ministry of Local Development (MLD) 6 9.4 4.0
Nepal Agricultural Research Council (NARC) 6 9.7 4.2
Village Development Committee (VDC) 11 5.4 4.3
This analysis of least influential—yet highly relevant—actors directs the analyst towards actors/
actor groups that are potentially marginalized in the policy development and implementation 
process. That is, those actors that are directly impacted or serve critical roles in the policy 
process, but do not leverage influence in any meaningful way. 
Discussion
Multilevel stakeholder influence mapping proves a useful tool for understanding cross-level 
power and influence dynamics and perspectives between actors/actor groups, and visualizing 
those relationships in a simple, straightforward methodology. The two major adaptations to the 
existing IIED influence-mapping tool (i.e., the translating of the policy apex across actor levels 
and the embedding of the tool in a semi-structured interview format) have been useful in 
capturing perceptions of power dynamics across levels and highlighting inequalities that exist 
within adaptation policy regimes. The drastic change in the actors/actor groups ranked highly 
influential by respondent sets operating at different actor levels speak to the former (cross-level 
perspective) and the consistent ranking of ‘farmers’ as least influential in the policy process to 
the latter (inequalities).
The pilot results also yield fruitful considerations for strategic entry into climate change policy 
regimes in Nepal, and key areas for improving equity within the policy stages. Specifically, the 
MoE, MoAD, and NPC are perceived to be among the most influential actor groups in the 
climate change adaptation regimes in agriculture, even when the method for determining an 
influence score is adapted. INGOs also rank consistently high in their perceived influence, 
suggesting, as other authors have pointed out, that a robust donor and INGO network has 
emerged in Nepal due to persistent instabilities in government and poor service delivery of 
development resources (Paudel 2010; Rai and Paudel 2011). Geopolitical considerations 
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identified in the mapping suggest that the Indian government’s policy portfolio is highly 
influential on Nepal’s agricultural sector. Particularly in the border regions, subsidies and other 
input distortions for Indian farmers impact directly on Nepal’s rural producers given the open 
border and free movement of goods between the two countries.
In the process of highlighting these important instances of power and influence, several 
methodological lessons were drawn out regarding, most notably, (1) the framing of definitional 
boundaries of power, (2) limitations of ‘perspective-based’ data, and (3) the potential for 
theoretical distance measurements.
Ubiquity of power
In the same way that adaptation is operationalized via complementary concepts like 
vulnerability, resilience, risk, exposure, and sensitivity, power too is dependent upon the related 
concepts of influence, authority, legitimacy, and legality, among others. The concept of power 
‘bases’ (i.e., the sources of exercised power) first emerged in 1959 through the work of French 
and Raven. These authors suggested that power could be separated into distinct forms or ‘bases,’ 
including reward, coercion, legitimacy, referent, and expert (French and Raven 1959). Several 
authors have since built on these initial bases (Ulrich 1983). Bases today include condign power 
(i.e., force based), coercion, compensation (i.e., resource and reward), condition (i.e., persuasion 
or consensus), personality (i.e., charisma), positionality, and expertise (i.e., knowledge).
Simply referring to ‘power’ or ‘influence’ without further defining the terms in the framing, the 
MSIM exercise can produce unclear conceptual boundaries for the respondent (and the analyst). 
Respondents are likely to be biased towards the identification of highly visible power bases 
(e.g., a Minister determined to be highly influential due to his or her position in government). 
Less-visible exercises of power including ‘expertise’ or ‘coercion’—which can be most 
effective—may not be recognized (or hidden) by (to) the respondent.
Yet this is not necessarily problematic. By leaving definitional boundaries vague, the 
respondent’s perspective as to what constitutes power or influence is revealed; a valuable result 
in itself. Ultimately, however, the framing of the exercises will depend on the objectives of the 
analysts. In the event of multiple case studies, for example, a well-articulated definition of 
power and influence may be selected to facilitate comparative analysis. Alternatively, in one-off 
studies, the analyst may choose to leave boundaries vague, or to conduct exploratory interviews 
prior to the exercise to determine contextually appropriate definitions of power or influence. 
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Perception-based analysis
The MSIM method provides the analyst with perceptions-based data regarding the relative 
power and influence of actors in Nepal’s adaptation regime. This does not necessarily speak to 
actual influence or capability of these agencies to ‘successfully’ develop and influence the 
policy process. As such, MSIM maps rely on triangulation between actor and actor groups 
operating at different user levels as a means of validation or results verification. Empirical 
evidence like budget allocations, results of decision-making processes (e.g., resulting policy 
objectives or priorities), participation in decision-making fora and so on can be used alongside 
MSIM maps to confirm or further clarify the sources or manifestations of power/influence.
Theoretical distance
The visual format of the MSIM method allows individual perceptions to be systematically 
aggregated to obtain the mean, mode, average, and variance of perceptions of the relative 
influence of actors for different social groups and for the entire country. In the methodology 
outlined in this paper, this is accomplished by drawing on the relative ranking of actor groups. 
But it could also be accomplished using Euclidian distance metrics which allow greater or lesser 
distances to contribute to the overall results as with preferential voting rather than with just a 
ranked list. This “theoretical distance” concept could be facilitated with a simple influence 
mapping software, for example.
Other key methodological considerations for the application of the MSIM tool include: (1) the 
recognition of the potentially sensitive nature of power/influence mapping (i.e., the need to 
ensure respondents anonymity), (2) the time required for respondents to undertake the activity 
and associated interview questions (e.g., the interviews lasted on average 1.5 hours), and (3) the 
focus on ‘actual’ behaviour between agents (i.e., the mapping captures the way that things are, 
and can be compared with intended institutional and actor structures through document and 
policy analysis for the ways that they ought to be).
Implications
It should be noted that the results and discussion above are based on a small sample of actors in 
Nepal’s climate change adaptation regime. The objective of the influence-mapping portion of 
this research was to test the feasibility of the MSIM method and to draw out key methodological 
considerations, not to produce unequivocal mapping results. Consequently, one must be careful 
not to overextend the implications of these findings using MSIM maps alone. As suggested in 
the introduction to the Nepal case study, the implications that follow here contain assertions that 
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have been informed by the MSIM maps, semi-structured in-depth interviews with actors across 
various levels of Nepal’s climate change adaptation regime, and a comprehensive policy content 
review of Nepal’s agriculture and climate change sectors (See CCAFS Working Paper No. 44 
[Sova and Chaudhury 2013]). In this context, the preliminary MSIM mapping results led the 
analyst towards exploring several areas of the policy process for which power inequalities 
between vulnerable populations and influential decision-makers were identified (i.e., the ‘key 
moments and mechanisms’). The objective of the following section is to explore these key 
policy areas—mainly, ambiguous central-level policy objectives, biased vulnerability 
assessment processes, and the ‘rendering technical’ of adaptation decisions—and to suggest 
ways in which less powerful, yet highly invested actors in Nepal’s adaptation regime, can be 
incorporated into the policy development process.
Ambiguity in policy objectives
Empirical evidence of the results of decision making in adaptation regimes can be collected 
through content analysis of relevant policy documents. Six central-level adaptation policies 
were identified in Nepal, including the National Adaptation Plan of Action (2010), Climate 
Change Policy (2011), Pilot Program on Climate Resilience (2010), Local Adaptation Plans of 
Action 2011, UNFCCC Initial communication (2004), and the Poverty-Environment Initiative 
(2010). Content analysis on these documents yielded a total of 33 unique objectives or priorities. 
Each of the documents contains contributions from Nepal’s Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Environment (MoSTE), an actor group consistently ranked highly influential by the full 
sample of respondents. 
“Improved biodiversity and natural resource management,” “capacity development,” and 
“vulnerability assessments” are among the most frequent of Nepal’s stated adaptation policy 
objectives. Wide, sweeping policy objectives like these are a necessity at this constitutional 
planning level. However, unlike ‘traditional’ sectors, institutions that transform these high-
resolution objectives into recognizable actions at lower user levels do not yet exist for climate 
change. The Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment in Nepal, the country’s 
UNFCCC focal agency, is a central-level coordinating body which has no bureaucratic or 
political representation beyond the capital city (as evidenced by its exclusion among highly 
influential actors from the perspective of local-level respondents – Table 5 above). It is, then, 
the responsibility of existing line agencies like the Ministry of Agriculture Development, 
burdened by dwindling budgets and insufficient human resources, to ensure that these stated 
policy goals are properly translated at ‘operational’ levels. 
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Recognizing this inherent limitation, Nepal has begun a process of piloting Local Adaptation 
Plans of Action (LAPAs) with the support of the UK Department for International Development 
(DfID) and a host of local NGOs. The aim of the LAPAs is to identify local adaptation needs 
that match broad priorities identified under the NAPA and to integrate these priorities through 
bottom-up approaches to adaptation policy mainstreaming. Given that communities view 
climate change alongside existing, multiple, and complex livelihood stressors (and on different 
temporal scales to that of national planning horizons), LAPAs are a welcome—and necessary—
addition to Nepal’s adaptation regime. Yet a critical assumption in the implementation of LAPAs 
is that sufficient capacity exists within local bodies (e.g., VDC and DDC offices) to incorporate 
climate resilience planning and project implementation. Spread thin by the lack of local 
elections (abolished in 2002), VDC secretaries and other local staff lack the strategic capacity 
and resources necessary for this climate policy integration (CPI) process.  
Action: Community representation can help to ease the burden of CPI, but will require re-
establishing local-level elections or devising other community planning interfaces. This is a 
position supported by Nepal’s Election commission. A decade-long election void persists due to 
central-level political infighting over the ratification of a new GoN Constitution and a modified 
federal administrative structure. Impending change in Nepal’s administrative structure 
highlights the need for adaptive and flexible adaptation institutions. As the adaptation needs of 
communities are immediate and the political and administrative will to renew elections distant, 
interim support is necessary. The Local Governance and Community Development Program 
(LGCDP), referenced in the detailed mapping example in the ‘results’ section above, should 
thus be extended and integrated more closely (i.e., formally recognized) within the LAPA 
process; that is, should the envisioned LAPA process continue to rely—to the extent currently 
envisioned—on government administrative units as a mechanism through which community 
voices are channelled. LGCDP has established social mobilizers in most districts and protocols 
for engaging marginalized populations in the development planning process.
Vulnerability assessments
Climate change fund and programme allocation in Nepal is based on vulnerability assessments 
conducted in the early phases of the National Adaptation Programme of Action (Nepal, 2010b) 
development process. Often the first step in determining adaptation resource distribution, the 
way in which vulnerability assessments are implemented and the variables included or excluded 
(and the various weights assigned to those variables/indices), will have considerable impact on 
who/what is considered for resource allocation and, by extension, who will partake in or be 
impacted by the adaptation decision-making process. Vulnerability assessments in Nepal were 
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conducted by the College of Applied Sciences (CAS-N) in consultation with MoSTE and the 
NAPA project team, all of which were determined highly influential actors themselves or 
associated with actors/actor groups deemed highly influential in MSIM. The vulnerability 
assessment process outlined in “Climate change vulnerability mapping for Nepal” (Nepal, 2010a) 
consists of climate risk/exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity maps derived from national 
district-level databases overlaid on Nepal’s 75 districts. Analysis of the vulnerable assessment as a 
“key mechanism” (step 8 in the IIED influence mapping methodology) provides important lessons 
in terms of the agricultural adaptation agenda setting and the knowledge-policy interface3. 
Take cereal production in Nepal’s NAPA overall vulnerability index rating as an entry point into 
this discussion. Rupandehi, this paper’s study district, is considered the top cereal-producing 
district in Nepal, accounting for a combined 240,668 metric tonnes of edible cereal (rice, maize, 
wheat, millet, barley, buck wheat) in 2010, followed closely by the Jhapa district with 213,093 
combined metric tonnes of cereal production (Statistical Information on Nepalese Agriculture, 
Agri-Business Promotion Statistics Division, 2010/11, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives-
MoAC). These top two producing agricultural districts are among the five districts in Nepal 
deemed “very low” in terms of vulnerability to climate change. This has obvious consequences for 
adaptation fund allocation in these highly productive agricultural districts, so it is worth 
investigating the metrics for determining Rupandehi’s vulnerability score.
The overall vulnerability rankings for Nepal were produced through an equal weighing (33.33%) 
of three separate indices: (1) Combined Sensitivity Index; (2) Combined Multiple Adaptation 
Capability Index; and (3) Combined Risk/Exposure Index. The breakdown of the Combined Risk/
Exposure Index can be found in Box 4 below4 as it will be used for more detailed discussion. 
3. Note that it would be easy for the reader to infer here that "vulnerability" is inherently a product of a “lack of influence.” And it is to 
a certain extent. Consider, for example, that a lack of participation in decision-making processes can have a negative impact on the 
effectiveness of the intervention ultimately chosen. Yet, the MSIM tool aims only to draw out who is in a position to make decisions 
regarding adaptation responses, and in itself does not get at who is likely to be positively or negatively impacted by the results of  
that power structure. This example of Nepal’s vulnerability assessments is intended to articulate the potential consequences of power 
inequalities in decision making. Measures of success and “winner and loser” constructs as shown in this example are produced by 
the CSH questions in which the exercise is embedded in, but they are not the intended visual outcome of the tool.
4. Details of the composition of each of these indices can be found in Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for Nepal (Nepal 2010a).
Box 4. Overview of the Combined Risk Exposure Index, one of three elements that   
combine to produce composite vulnerability scores in Nepal
Combined Risk Exposure Index = (Landslide risk index) {1/6} + (Flood Risk Index) {1/6} + (Drought Risk Index) 
{1/6} + (GLOFa Risk Index) {1/6} + (Ecological Risk Index [Per Hectare Forest Dependence + HPIb Index + Accessibility 
Index] {1/6} + (Rainfall and Temperature Index) {1/6}
a  GLOF: Glacial Lake Outburst Flood
b  HPI: Human Poverty Index
Source:  Nepal, 2010a.
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It is important to recognize that the overall vulnerability rankings for Nepal are designed to 
indicate vulnerability to a variety of stressors across multiple sectors and activities. 
Consequently, variables most relevant to agriculture alone (i.e., temperature and rainfall, flood, 
drought) can be buried within composite indices. Rainfall and temperature risks indices, for 
example, represent 1/6 (rainfall and temperature risk exposure, see Box 4) of 1/3 (combined 
risk exposure) of the overall vulnerability ranking for Nepal’s districts. As a result, 
vulnerability in agricultural systems can be understated or diluted by the inclusion of all-
inclusive sector variables. 
In recognition of this, Risk Specific Vulnerability Indices are also included in the MoSTE 
Vulnerability Mapping document to compensate for this aggregation of risks, sensitivities, and 
adaptive capacities found in combined vulnerability indices. Risk specific indices, for example, 
were produced for (1) rainfall and temperature vulnerability, (2) ecological vulnerability,  
(3) landslide vulnerability, (4) flood vulnerability, (5) drought vulnerability, and (6) GLOF 
vulnerability. The risk specific indices combine, in equal parts (33.33%), a socioeconomic 
index, a combined adaptation index, and a risk specific sub-index. 
These Risk Specific Vulnerability Indices have been used in the document to identify 
“prioritized districts for adaptation planning” (Nepal 2010a), a list in which Rupandehi has not 
been included. Temperature and rainfall have not been explicitly included in the list of “risk/
exposure” areas for which districts have been prioritized, while the remaining five ‘specific 
risks’ (ecology, landslide, flood, drought, and GLOFs) have. While flood and drought are 
inextricably linked with temperature and rainfall, they represent the extremes (and intensity) of 
temperature and rainfall and do not address more progressive and equally risky trends in 
temperature increases and rainfall patterns. Considering that many crops grown in the Terai 
region hover dangerously close to temperature and moisture thresholds, the risk from 
temperature and precipitation trends alone (i.e., without reference to the ‘downstream’ risks of 
drought and flood) are important indicators of vulnerability. 
Action: The impacts of crop loss from a threshold temperature or rainfall event, among these, 
the highest cereal-producing districts in Nepal, would have ripple effects across Nepal’s 
economy and impacts on the wellbeing of both its rural and urban populations5. As such, 
vulnerability assessments that reflect the dangerous downstream impacts of crop loss by 
incorporating temperature and precipitation more centrally in composite indices should be 
5. It is difficult to separate out political vulnerability from other biophysical and socioeconomic vulnerabilities, as articulated in this 
example. Biophysical and socioeconomic conditions—particularly in a place like Nepal with difficult topography and persistent 
caste structures—are often responsible for framing the factors that grant access to the decision-making process, be it physical 
distance or social norms.
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considered. Furthermore, temperature and rainfall risk in the referenced assessment have been 
determined from a 2009 Practical Action study that monitored data from 44 temperature and  
166 precipitation stations in Nepal from 1976–2005 to draw out forward-looking trends in 
temperature and precipitation (both seasonal and annual) using linear regression. The linear 
extrapolation of observed precipitation and temperature trends as a measure of risk/exposure can 
produce potentially misleading results. The effects of accumulating greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
on precipitation and temperature are that changes in climate systems will outpace existing 
trends, producing often unanticipated impacts on the climate system though complex feedback 
loops. Forecasted precipitation trends constructed using downscaled General Circulation Models 
(GCMs) and IPCC Special Report emissions scenarios (SRES) (IPCC 2000) that take these 
factors into account, although imperfectly, provide a sturdier foundation on which to assess 
temperature and precipitation risk and exposure.
Anti-politics of adaptation
The final policy area for further examination emerging from the MSIM tool is the trend towards 
purely “expert-level” engagement in adaptation regimes. Inherent uncertainties in climate 
impacts in Nepal have led to the tendency to “render technical” (i.e., delegate decision making 
to ‘experts’)—to borrow a term from Tania Murray-Li (Murray-Li 2007)—decisions 
surrounding adaptation measures. That is to say, if local communities are entirely unaware of 
the impacts of climate change, how can they establish ‘interests’ with regard to their own 
livelihood responses? Knowledge and expertise, then, were deemed key power bases by MSIM 
respondents, a trend which is explored here in the context of NAPA development. 
The NAPA, the cornerstone document of Nepal’s adaptation regime, was structured according to 
guidelines developed by the LDCs’ Export Group (LEG) and was implemented by MoSTE, the 
Embassy of Denmark, DfID, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)-Nepal. Six thematic working groups (TWG) were developed 
in the NAPA process and managed by an advisory board including bureaucrats from the 
Ministry of Environment, National Planning Commission, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation, Ministry of Physical Planning and 
Works, Ministry of Energy, Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, Ministry of Health and 
Population, UNDP-Nepal, Federation of Community Forest Users, Institute of Engineering, and 
the Association of District Development Committees. Finally, a leading project team was 
established to ensure timely development of the NAPA and consisted of five external “climate 
change specialists,” and a group of managers and directors from the Ministry of Environment. 
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In November 2009, these TWG and project team members conducted three separate NAPA 
‘transect appraisals’ in Western, Central, and Eastern development zones, respectively, to 
produce microlevel impact assessments. These assessments were then referred back to the 
TWGs for a prioritization of adaptation responses (Nepal 2010b).  
The result of this techno-centric process is USD 350 million allocated towards implementing 
Nepal’s NAPA based on less than four weeks of consultation with select local stakeholders in a 
sample of Nepal’s districts. The limited consultation with local stakeholders in the NAPA 
process is reflective of a wider trend in Nepal. The country has been embroiled in on-going 
political conflict which has led to violent revolt, frequent changes of leadership and, at present, 
has left the country void of a working parliament and “between” constitutions. At the heart of 
this conflict is an entrenched caste system, which breeds a sense of fatalism amongst Nepal’s 
indigenous, Dalit and ‘untouchable’ classes (Bista 1991). As such, the proliferation of climate 
change policies and institutions since 2010 has occurred in the context of technocratic and 
bureaucratic rule, providing space (and opportunity) for multilateral donors and INGOs to fill a 
critical decision-making void.
Action: Adaptation regimes in Nepal require renewed focus on building national (and 
subnational) ownership over adaptation regimes and recognition that, at present, CPI/
mainstreaming is occurring into existing inequality-producing structures driven by externally 
imposed development regimes. Adaptation must be brought back into the field of political 
debate and not “rendered technical” so that local stakeholders—not donor reporting matrices—
determine what is considered success in adaptation, and who ought to be benefited. This can be 
facilitated through implementing a shared-learning dialogue (SLD) approach as recommended 
by Dixit et al. (2011) which combines top-down scientific and technical considerations with 
bottom-up, context-specific considerations and development objectives of vulnerable 
stakeholders. The LAPA process has rightly adopted such an approach, yet it must be careful in 
recognizing that incremental improvement in the service delivery of “development” activities at 
local levels reflects the inseparable nature of complex, multiple livelihoods stressors, and is not 
necessarily at odds with fixed definitions of “adaptation” at higher levels. Also, the NAPA 
document—which remains the apex adaptation planning document in Nepal—must be seen as a 
living document that is informed by LAPA process and amendable based on the results of the 
more robust SLD process that the LAPA is able to provide. Given the short period of 
community-level stakeholder consultation in the NAPA development process, policy learning 
must occur in both directions, with the LAPA serving to reshape the NAPA as time and field-
level realities change.
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Areas for continued research
Several areas of the adaptation policy process warrant further investigation for their vulnerability 
to—or production of—unequal power dynamics. They are included here in summary form.
1. Discourse analysis: Hermeneutics, or the study of texts, can be useful in elucidating 
instances of power creation or reinforcement in written documents, a principal medium 
through which discourses are developed, reinforced, and maintained. Discourses, in turn, are 
important sources of power. Research in the area of adaptation policy analysis should 
consider the way in which written adaptation policies reinforce inequalities or produce new 
inequality-producing mechanisms. Spoken discourses around climate change also represent 
an important research need in this area.  
2. Decentralization: Decentralization or devolution of decision making is an important factor 
in decision making in Nepal, and thus an important factor in determining power relationships. 
As suggested by Heller (2001), however, decentralization does not always go hand in hand 
with the devolution of decision-making power. That is, securing local political representation 
is a way of extending control and the creation of subjects. Research in the area of 
decentralization of administrative decision making can contribute to our improved 
understanding and progress towards equitable adaptation institutional structures. 
3. Political ecology: Given the cross-cutting nature of climate change, the factors that 
determine power in decision making in this sector can be the products of history, culture/
worldview, policies/rules/procedures, organizational structure (architecture), demographics, 
geopolitics, and so on. This multitude of factors contributes to an understanding of which 
power bases are viable in a given circumstance. They are, collectively, the “things” of an 
emerging “political ecology” community of practice (Robbins 2011). A political ecological 
perspective can be useful in framing adaptation decisions within the broader context in which 
they are embedded; a multilevel approach recognizing these complexities is needed in 
adaptation research. 
 
4. Actor networks: Power is often maintained through networks of actors, reinforced, or 
undermined through the formation or dissolution of alliances between actors wielding various 
competing or complementary resource bases. Research into how actor networks develop 
around power structures (or vice versa), with specific reference to actor interests and resource 
bases—funding, most notably—is needed to expand our understanding of how power is 
created, reinforced, or undermined in complex multistakeholder, multilevel systems. 
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5. Conceptual framework: The challenge in studying power in any system is its ubiquity. As 
such, a conceptual or analytical framework that facilitates this process is recommended. 
The Earth Systems Governance (ESG) project, a ten-year initiative of the Earth System 
Science Partnership (ESSP), identifies power as a key cross-cutting theme in its research 
agenda. Despite advising against an exclusive definition of power, ESG suggests that one 
potentially useful way of conceptualizing the topic is to consider Steven Lukes’s 
dimensions: decision making, agenda setting, and preference shaping (Lukes 2005). This 
conceptual or analytical framework is particularly useful since it recognizes more nuanced 
manifestations of power, which assists in understanding its implications in climate change 
adaptation policy. Mainly, Lukes addresses how certain actors are able to “shape or  
re-define the context in which actors are engaged, or if ‘the game’ is to be played at all” 
(Biermann et al. 2010). Considering the uncertainties and lack of consensus regarding 
proactive measures to address climate change, these agenda setting and preference-shaping 
dimensions of power are perhaps more descriptive than decision making alone (i.e., 
adaptation projects chosen or budget allocations to adaptation programmes/projects) and 
could be considered as a potential conceptual framework for advancing our understanding 












Appendix 1. Example MSIM power-mapping board
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